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Abstract—In this paper, the Stackelberg game models are
used for supporting the decisions on task scheduling and re-
source utilization in computational clouds. Stackelberg games
are asymmetric games, where a speciﬁc group of players’ acts
ﬁrst as leaders, and the rest of the players follow the lead-
ers’ decisions and make their decisions based on the leader’s
actions. In the proposed model, the optimal schedules are gen-
erated under the security criteria along with the generation
of the optimal virtual machines set for the scheduled batch of
tasks. The security criteria are deﬁned as security require-
ments for mapping tasks onto virtual machines with speciﬁed
trust level. The eﬀectiveness of the proposed method has been
veriﬁed in the realistic use cases with in the cloud environment
with OpenStack and Amazon Cloud standards.
Keywords—cloud computing, resource optimization, Stackelberg
equilibrium, Stackelberg games.
1. Introduction
The problem of optimal resource allocation and utilization
in computational clouds (CC) remains challenging research
task in today’s parallel computing. The considered com-
putational infrastructure contains a large set of virtual ma-
chines (VMs) implemented in physical resources in dis-
tributed private and public cloud clusters. In public clouds,
the customer can use any number of VMs and pay for used
resources. The cloud provider collects the tasks from the
users, analyzes the customers’ requirements and tries to
allocate the virtual and physical resources based on such
requirements. Therefore, the users’ requests for the ac-
cess to the cloud services and resources may be dynamic.
The users may change the number of VMs, which can
be utilized. Therefore, the system must ensure the proper
scheduling policies for such dynamic environment.
Task scheduling in the dynamic cloud environments is
a complex process of contains multiple stages. Tasks may
be scheduled as batch with (dependent) or without (in-
dependent) correlations among them [1]. In the schedul-
ing process, the following special security-related users’
requirements may be taken into account: selection of an
appropriate amount of resources for utilization, safety, se-
curity, and intrusion detection. It may be also assumed that
idle time for the resource should be minimal. Such con-
ditions improve the energy awareness in scheduling, tasks
execution, and building of the green cloud architectures.
The set of VMs may be selected based on the estimation of
the cost of scheduling, maximal utilization of the memory,
and bandwidth, service access, etc.
This paper proposes a new model of selection and alloca-
tion of VMs in batch scheduling. In that model we focus on
cloud services select based on the users’ requirements. The
scheduling model is based on central scheduling unit. The
polymatrix extensive Stackelberg games are used for calcu-
lation of the optimal choosing strategies for the available
cloud resources.
The model has been veriﬁed in a simple experimental anal-
ysis based on use cases speciﬁed for two sets of VMs imple-
mented in the cloud clusters in OpenStack Racspace plat-
form and Amazon Cloud.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the back-
grounds of virtualization of the cloud resources and task
scheduling in cloud systems are presented. In Section 3 se-
curity characteristics are deﬁned, which must provide each
of cloud environment. In Sections 4 and 5 related work is
reviewed, considered problems are deﬁned and tasks repre-
sentation and models are explained. In Section 6 we present
polymatrix extensive Stackelberg Games models. In Sec-
tions 7 and 8 the application of the Stackelberg Games as
the support of the decision processes in the optimization
of the VMs parameters are presented. In Section 9 the
results of the application of the proposed model in realis-
tic use case are shown. Finally, the paper is concluded in
Section 10.
2. VMs Optimization and Task
Scheduling in CC Systems
In CC infrastructure, VMs are the main target “resources”
available and selected for scheduling of the computational
tasks. They may be created from the images of VMs on
demand. VMs can be conﬁgured with the characteristics
speciﬁed in Tables 1 and 2. Tasks are mapped into VMs by
using various scheduling procedures. In the case of batch
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scheduling, the tasks are grouped into batches. For each
consecutive batch, a diﬀerent workload can be calculated
based on the number of atomic numerical operations per
second estimated for each task in the batch. It can be
interpreted as task complexity measure.
Table 1
Selected Amazon Cloud VM instances
Model vCPUs
CPU credits Mem
per hour [GB]
t2.nano 1 3 0.5
t2.small 1 12 2
t2.xlarge 4 54 16
t2.2xlarge 8 81 32
m4.16xlarge 64 120 256
Table 2
Selected OpenStack cloud VM instances
Flavor vCPUs Disk [GB] RAM [GB]
General1-1 1 20 SSD 1
General1-2 2 40 SSD 2
General1-4 4 80 SSD 4
General1-8 8 160 8
In CC, the pay-as-you-go model of provisioning of the
cloud resources is used. It means that the cloud user pays
only for the utilization of those cloud resources, which are
used for the task execution. Therefore, for each batch of
tasks, diﬀerent number of VMs may be employed. The total
cost of the utilization of the cloud resources must be calcu-
lated for each batch. In the case of centralized scheduling,
the characteristics of the cloud computational nodes must
be speciﬁed before the start of the scheduling process. As
major scheduling measure the makespan [2] can be used
calculated for the batch of tasks.
3. Security Demands in Task Scheduling
and Task Execution in CCs
Security remains one of the main challenges and crucial
issues in CC [3]. Strong security requirements speciﬁed by
the users may be the reason of high costs of the utilization
of the cloud services. In the case of considering secu-
rity issues as additional scheduling and resource allocation
criteria, the execution time of tasks can be longer due to
execution of some speciﬁc additional operations before or
after the task calculation. Such “additional operations” can
be deﬁned as:
• task integrity checking,
• using cryptography algorithm for decoding the nec-
essary data, that was previously ciphered for security,
• using cryptography algorithm for coding the data to
be stored,
• additional identity checking procedures during send-
ing data from one cloud cluster to another.
Additionally, diﬀerent tasks may need diﬀerent security re-
quirements. In some cases, the access to data and resources
are restricted by law [4]–[6]. For instance, the conﬁdential
medical data processing requires higher level of security
than free stock photograph processing. Therefore, in the
presented paper, an individual security level parameter is
deﬁned for each task. The task can be sent to the resource,
which “guarantees” to keep the proper security level.
In this paper, we propose the model, in which the trust lev-
els of VMs are speciﬁed based on the Federal Information
Processing (FIPS) and ISO/IEC 19790 standards [7]:
1. trust level 1 – at least one approved algorithm or
security function shall be used;
2. trust level 2 – system equipped with role-based au-
thentication: cryptographic module authenticates the
authorization of all sides of communication;
3. trust level 3 – identity–based authentication mech-
anisms: a cryptographic module authenticates the
identity of sides of communication and veriﬁes that
their IDs are authorized to assume a speciﬁc role and
perform a certain services. The entry or output of
every plaintext has to be processed inside a module
using a trusted path from other interfaces. Plaintext
may be entered into or sent in output from the cryp-
tographic module in encrypted form;
4. trust level 4 – the highest level of security. Pene-
tration of the cryptographic module enclosure from
any direction. Very low probability of cryptography
procedures failure. The immediate suppression of all
operations.
The example of realization of these services for OpenStack
platform may be found in [8] and [9]. The relevant services
for Amazon Cloud are given by cloud provider.
4. Related Works and Problem
Deﬁnition
Although many scheduling methods in cloud environments
have been proposed so far, only some of them are based
on the game theory. In this section, we survey the most
important developments in this area.
Ananth and Chandrasekaran [10] deﬁned model in which
the cloud resource utilization function and proﬁt function
for the service provider are maximized. The other con-
sidered optimization criteria are the minimization of the
deadline violation and makespan estimated for available
resources. The overall scheduling problem is deﬁned as
multi-objective task. The proposed schedulers are based
on the game theory and genetic algorithms. The Pareto op-
timal solutions are estimated by using the non-dominated
sorting genetic algorithm.
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Geethanjali et al. in [11] deﬁned the problem of the recog-
nition of the wrong data generated by the service and re-
source providers. The aim of each cloud service provider
is to maximize his proﬁts. The authors assume that they
may generate and distribute the incorrect information
about the oﬀered services. The authors show the schedul-
ing mechanism for real time tasks to gain timing con-
straint, which ensures that the information distributed by
the provider is truthful. It means that the minimal costs of
the resource utilization and service usage are guaranteed.
The authors use auction game with the Nash equilibrium
as solution. In their game only one provider – the win-
ner of the game – can receive all submitted tasks for cal-
culation.
In [12], Qiu et al. proposed mechanism to manage the con-
tact between the broker and private clouds to ensure that
beneﬁts of both the broker and the private clouds are maxi-
mized. They proposed a model with two-stage Stackelberg
game. Leader decides and proposes pricing for renting
all type of VMs for each private cloud, and each private
cloud conﬁrms the amount of VMs and the possibility of
their rent. The main diﬀerence between that model and
the model presented in this paper is that in [12] the authors
assume the possibility that some task may not be scheduled.
The tasks are organized in queues for distribution amount
virtual resources. In this paper, we propose central sched-
uler instead tasks queuing. There are no privileged tasks.
Tasks are treated as equally important. Additionally, all
tasks must be scheduled to the machines. In this proposal
the payoﬀ functions may take several forms, such as en-
ergy spend on computation or minimum time for rebooting
the system.
Shie et al. [13] use the game theory in their scheduling
model for solving the resource competition game in the
federated cloud. The Nash games are used. The results
of experiments show that the cloud provider can get some
extra proﬁts by outsourcing resources if federated cloud
has suﬃcient idle resources. In contrary to our proposal,
the authors consider only Nash equilibrium case. These
kinds of games do not allow making sequential decisions,
which are possible in presented model. The model devel-
oped in this paper is about activities during tasks process-
ing in the cloud system. This is the main reason of using
Stackelberg games, in which the decisions are taken with
certain succession. The cloud system is modeled by us-
ing the system of autonomous software agent (MAS) as
the main unit, the Master and the farm of virtual resources
(see Fig. 1). The ECT matrix model is used as the cen-
tral scheduler [2]. Computing capacities of the resources
must be speciﬁed for the calculation of the schedules. They
are also the main constrain in the generation of the opti-
mal schedule(-s). There are two other parameters speciﬁed.
One of them is security level that VM may provide. Second
parameter is the security requirements of the tasks that have
been speciﬁed by the user. The security levels declared by
the VMs should correspond to the security requirements
of the tasks.
Fig. 1. Cloud model and hierarchy.
We consider two rounds of the games (Fig. 2) with three
actions done automatically during each round of the game.
Such a game also reﬂects diﬀerent or competitive interests
of game participants.
Table 3
The costs of renting of selected VM instances
Model Price per hour
Amazon Cloud
t2.nano $0.0065
t2.small $0.026
t2.xlarge $0.188
t2.2xlarge $0.376
m4.16xlarge $3.83
OpenStack
General1-1 £0.0035
General1-2 £0.007
General1-4 £0.014
General1-8 £0.028
5. Security Aware Cloud Resources and
Tasks Modeling
The centralized scheduler considered in this paper, may
be deﬁned based on the general master-slave model (see
Fig. 1). The master unit is responsible for task scheduling
based on the resources available in the system. The sets of
VMs can be implemented in each physical resource inde-
pendently or based on the conﬁguration of the other virtual
resources.
The proposed model is suitable for cloud environment char-
acterized as follows:
• a fully distributed environment with speciﬁed n−1
number of computational virtual resources,
• all tasks are generated by the system users and pro-
cessed in batches,
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Fig. 2. Main game block diagram.
• each batch is composed of T tasks,
• a variety of computing capabilities, access modes,
and response times is possible for all participating
virtual resources,
• the performance of any given task on a single VM
is neither related nor aﬀected by the performance of
any other VM,
• the number of VMs is ﬁxed and remains constant
during the execution of generated schedules,
• the scheduler sends the tasks one batch after another,
• there is no virtual resources without tasks – each
resource has assigned at least one task, therefore must
declare at least one VM,
• the tasks are independent,
• each task is calculated by one resource,
• all tasks in the batch have to be assigned and exe-
cuted.
The following parameters should be speciﬁed for VM con-
ﬁguration:
• the number of units in the system: one master and
n−1 slaves, that gives n units;
• proper task description for tasks t = 1, . . . ,T ;
• security classes for tasks and virtual resources:
TASKsec = [Tsec1, . . . ,T secK ] available K secu-
rity classes for the tasks and WORKsec =
[W sec1, . . . ,W secL] available L security classes for
the virtual resources. For the clarity of presentation it
is assumed, that: TASKsec =WORKsec = [1, 2, 3, 4].
• security demand vector SD ∈ {1 . . .K}T for all the
tasks in the batch. Each element of security demand
vector SDt corresponds to one class from TASKsec
vector and indicates that this task requires at least
this particular security level;
• security capabilities of each resource are repre-
sented by trust level TL vector denoted by T L =
[tl1, . . . ,tln−1] ∈ {1 . . .L}n−1. Each element of this
vector indicates one class from WORKsec. Declara-
tion of particular trust level means that the resource
may operate at that trust lever or lower. For the clar-
ity of presentation SD,TL ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4};
• security classes for tasks and resource are speciﬁed
as follows: the task t is scheduled for resource i if
and only if SDt <= tli [9];
• workload vector for all T tasks in the batch WL =
[w1, . . . ,wT ], expressed in giga ﬂoating point opera-
tions per second (GFLOPS);
• the computing capacity vector for each of n−1 virtual
resources in GFLOPS CC = [cc1, . . . ,ccn−1] [2];
• available VM types: VMi the set of VM of each
available type that may be created by resource num-
ber i;
• CCVMi the set of computer capacities of VM of each
available type that may be created by i;
• proper mapping of security requirements at the mas-
ter – slave level: SD into TL and WL into CC;
• cost for particular VMS is calculated per hour of
working and formulates the cost vector: costVMi =
[costVMi(1), . . . ,costVMi(Mi)], see Table 3.
6. Polymatrix Extensive Stackelberg
Games Modeling
The n-player normal game Γn can be deﬁned as [14]:
Γn =
(
N,{Si}i∈N ,{Qi}i∈N
)
, (1)
where:
• N = {1, . . . ,n} is the set of players,
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• {S1, . . . ,Sn} (cardSi ≥ 2; i = 1, . . . ,n ) is the set of
strategies for the players,
• {H1, . . . ,Hn};Hi : S1×·· ·×Sn →R; ∀i=1,...,n is the set
of payoﬀ functions of the players.
The strategy of the player in the game is a plan of actions
to make the game beneﬁcial for him.
Stackelberg games are non-symmetric games, where one
player (leader) or speciﬁed group of players (leaders) have
the privileged position and plays ﬁrst, and the rest of the
players follow the leader and make their decisions based
on the leader’s actions [15]. Polymatrix game is the game
where players’ strategies form ﬁnite sets. The payoﬀ of
the player i is deﬁned by the following multi–dimensional
matrix [16]:
Hi = Hi( j1, . . . , jn), i ∈ N . (2)
The class of mixed strategies of the player number i is
denoted by
xi = (x
i
1, . . . ,x
i
pi) , (3)
where xij is the probability that player i chooses the strategy
j ∈ {1, , pi}. Based on the strategy proﬁle x = (x1, ,xn), the
expected payoﬀ of player i is calculated as:
Hi(x1, ,xn) =
p1∑
j1=1
. . .
pn
∑
jn=1
Hi( j1, , jn)x1j1 · . . . · xnjn , i ∈ N. (4)
Extensive-form n-player games are games where the above
values may be changed when the next round begins.
7. Stackelberg Games in Cloud Systems
7.1. The Game Theory Approach for Scheduler and
Virtual Resources
The schedule is calculated for each batch separately accord-
ing to the tasks and computing capacities of the virtual re-
sources. The master unit priority is to calculate the batch
as soon as possible. The virtual resources unit is designed
to ﬁnd the set of VMs that fulﬁlls declared computing ca-
pacity and minimize the computation cost. Therefore, the
functionality may be considered as the Stackelberg game:
virtual resources are behaving as the leaders playing com-
puter capacity as the strategy and master unit is the follower
responding the tasks splitting. Because tasks batches and
their security demands may consume very much time, this
is extensive game. The leader strategy is a ﬁnite type –
there are ﬁnite VM types in the system to be chosen from.
The follower strategy is also ﬁnite: there is ﬁnite number
of possibilities for splitting given tasks for certain num-
ber of virtual resources. This is why the situation may be
modeled as the polymatrix game.
Resource is charged for his services using pay-as-you-go
cloud model. It means that the more tasks it gets the higher
the payment will be. The payoﬀ in the game is the highest if
the cost of the VMs set is minimized keeping the computing
capacity constant [15]. The computational cost of security
operations (bias) may cause the oﬀer less attractive for the
follower. This is because the cost of computation is high,
but it may be lowered.
Let us assume, that the set of players n is equal the number
of virtual resources plus master. Then virtual resources
may be numbered i = 1, 2, . . . ,n−1, the master unit is the
player number n. The game is played according to the
following rules, see Figs. 1–2:
• the leader is a set of virtual resources (the slaves),
• the follower is the central scheduling unit (the
master),
• the leader proposing the computing capacity and de-
cides ﬁrst,
• the follower choosing the schedule and decides sec-
ond,
• main game is ruling the capacity declaration and task
scheduling,
• sub-game for virtual resources is also performed
which allows ﬁnding the optimal resources for de-
clared computing capacity and knowing task set con-
sidering the schedule.
Therefore, the following 5 steps have to be executed in each
round of the game:
1. Batch of tasks is loaded to the master unit.
2. For all virtual resources i trust level tli is declared
and computing capacities cci are calculated using the
polymatrix game.
3. The follower calculates the schedule for all virtual
resources. The schedule splits the given batch into
virtual resources. The follower calculates also his
strategy Sn and ﬁnds his payoﬀ Hn. Then, the tasks
are sent to virtual resources.
4. Each virtual resource is performing the sub-game:
the follower computes his security bias b and strategy
for choosing available VMs. Then, after setting the
appropriate VMs set, tasks are computed.
5. return to step 1.
7.2. The Leader’s Behavior
Let the
VMi = [VMi(1), . . . ,VMi(Mi)] (5)
be the number of VM of each available type that is
created by resource number i = 1,2, . . . ,n − 1. For in-
stance, it can be read from Table 1. VM2 = [VM2(1),
V M2(2), VM2(3), VM2(4), VM2(5)] = [3, 2, 0, 1, 4] that
the second resource has 5 VM types, and the proﬁle is
3 · t2.nano VMs, 2 · t2.small, 0 · t2.large, 1 · t2.2 · large,
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4 ·m416large; M1 = 4 [15]. Let us assume that the number
of available machines lies in range of
VMi(1) ∈ [1,mi(1)], . . . ,V Mi(Mi) ∈ [1,mi(Mi)] . (6)
Let the
CCVMi = [CCV Mi(1), . . . , [CCVMi(Mi)] (7)
be the set of computer capacities of VM of each avail-
able type that may be created by resource number i =
1, 2, . . . , n−1. If VMs are working in the parallel mode
then
cci =VMi(1)CCVMi(1)+ · · ·+VMi(Mi)CCV Mi(Mi). (8)
We denote by CCV Mmini the smallest possible computing
capacity available per resource i. Then computing capacity
may be declared from the range:
[
1 ·CCVMmini , mi(1) CCVMi(1)+ . . .
+mi(Mi) CCVMi(Mi)
]
=
[
ccmini , cc
imax
]
.
(9)
We consider the possible computing capacities in ascending
order. Then resource i may declare one of pi possible
values:
cc1i , cc
2
i , . . . ,cc
pi
i . (10)
The security capability of each resource i is represented by
trust level tli and it is constant in time. It does not change
during the game round.
7.3. The Follower Behavior for Obtaining the Schedule
We used the Expected Time to Compute (ETC) matrix
model for calculation of the schedules [17]:
ETC[t][i] = wt
cci
, (11)
that results to
ETC =
[
wt
cci
]t=1,2, ...,T
i=1,2, ...,n−1
(12)
for each of i-th resource and t-th task. Scheduling objective
as far as the performance of the task calculating is the
makespan that equals the time when the latest task is done:
makespan = min
S∈Schedules
{
max
j∈Tasks
C j
}
, (13)
where C j is the time when task j is ﬁnalized, Tasks are
all tasks submitted to system and Schedules is the set of all
possible schedules. In addition, security demand SD vector
that describes security demands for each task indicates if
the task may be assigned to machine represented by trust
level T L vector.
If we have n−1 virtual resources and T tasks in the batch,
the number of all possible schedules is much higher than
considering security demands and trust levels.
7.4. Main Game Model
During main stage of the Stackelberg game, the user of
the virtual resources have to decide about their computing
capacities. Then the master calculates the schedule. After
the tasks are sent to the virtual resources, each of resource
is optimizing his set of VMs, see Fig. 2.
The possible mixed strategy for the player deﬁned by see
Eq. (3) is the probability that he chooses certain computing
capacity deﬁned by Eq. (10). The player i = n (the follower)
chooses certain schedule from all pn = s possible schedules
using pure strategy model, that is xn ∈ {0,1}.
The payoﬀ matrices from Eqs. (2) and (4) are deﬁned in
the form of:
• the makespan for known declared computing capac-
ities and chosen schedule is:
Hn( j1, , jn) = makespan( j1, , jn) , (14)
• the schedule independent utility function reﬂects the
situation when each certain resource strategy inﬂu-
ence the payoﬀ of the other virtual resources:
Hi( j1, , jn) = ui( j1, , jn−1), i = 1, 2, . . . , n−1 , (15)
• the schedule independent utility function when vir-
tual resources payoﬀs are independent from other vir-
tual resources decisions:
Hi( j1, , jn) = ui( ji), i = 1, 2 . . . , n−1 . (16)
These payoﬀ functions may be time dependent, round de-
pendent or history dependent. Additional designations were
omitted for clarity of presentation.
The solution of the Stackelberg game is called Stackelberg
equilibrium [14]. In such a case, each follower observes the
leader’s strategy x and responds with strategy f (x) : x → y
that is optimal with respect to his expected payoﬀ. We can
deﬁne two types of Stackelberg equilibrium points: Strong
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) and Weak Stackelberg Equi-
librium (WSE). SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in
favor of the defender. It means that he chooses his optimal
strategy, which is also optimal from the leader’s perspec-
tive. WSE assumes that the follower chooses the worst
strategy from the leader’s perspective [18].
Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1) be the leader strategy and f (x) =
xn be the follower response. Then the game is as follows:
• for ﬁxed leader strategy x the follower solves the lin-
ear problem to ﬁnd his optimal response:
min
xn
p1∑
j1=1
. . .
s
∑
jn=1
makespan( j1, , jn)x1j1 · . . . · xnjn , (17)
with constraints that means that every pure strategy
is possible:
jn=s, jn>=0
∑
jn=1
xnjn = 1; (18)
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• the leader ﬁnds the strategy x that maximizes his
utility, under the assumption that the follower used
optimal response xn:
1. in cooperation mode:
max
x
p1∑
j1=1
. . .
s
∑
jn=1
Hi( j1, , jn)x1j1 · . . . · xnjn =
= max
x
p1∑
j1=1
. . .
pn−1
∑
jn−1=1
ui( j1, , jn−1)x1j1 · . . . · xn−1jn−1 ,
(19)
with assumption that each mixed strategy is
possible:
j1=p1∑
j1=1
x1j1 = 1,x
1
j1 ∈ [0,1] ,
j2=p1∑
j2=1
x2j2 = 1,x
2
j2 ∈ [0,1] ,
. . .
jn−1=pn−1
∑
jn−1=1
xn−1jn−1 = 1,x
n−1
jn−1 ∈ [0,1] ; (20)
2. in non-cooperation mode:
max
x
p1∑
j1=1
. . .
s
∑
jn=1
Hi( j1, , jn)x1j1 · . . . · xnjn =
= max
x
pi∑
ji=1
ui( ji)xiji ,
(21)
with assumption that each mixed strategy is
possible:
ji=pi∑
ji=1
xiji = 1,x
i
ji ∈ [0,1] . (22)
The optimal strategy, denoted by [x11, x
1
2, . . . , x
1
p1 ] = [
1
24 ,
1
6 ,
1
12 , . . . ,
1
3 ], means that user of the resource number 1
should declare the lowest possible computing capacity with
probability 14 , next consecutive computing capacity with
probability 16 , and so on, and maximum computing capac-
ity with probability 13 .
7.5. Sub-game Model
When computing capacities were chosen and the schedule
is known, the set of VM may be set. The strategy of VMs
capacities declaring is given by the Eq. (5) with constraints
deﬁned by Eqs. (6) and (8). The economical cost of the all
created VMs is calculated per hour:
costVMi = [costVMi(1), . . . , costVMi(Mi)] . (23)
Therefore, for each resource i, one hour of working (for the
set of VMs having declared computing capacity) costs:
cost(i)=VMi(1)costVMi(1)+ . . .
. . . +VMi(Mi) = Costi(Mi) .
(24)
Let the W (i) be the workload of all Ti tasks scheduled for
resource i. Each resource needs to meet the time deadline
given by ETC matrix, see Eq. (12). It result to
time(i) =
W (i)
cci
(25)
seconds for computing given tasks. The cost of computing
given tasks is:
time(i) =
cost(i)
3600 . (26)
The aim of the sub-game is to ﬁnd the VM conﬁguration
what cost the least. To do it, we have to to solve to problem:
argmin[VMi(1),...,VMi(Mi) . . . (27)
W (i)
cci
·
VMi(1)costVMi(1)
3600 + . . .
. . .+
V Mi(Mi)costVMi(Mi)
3600 (28)
with constraints (6) and (8).
8. Search for Strategies and Equilibrium
The following conditions have to be satisﬁed to ﬁnd Strong
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) [15]:
• the leader plays his best-response strategy,
• the follower plays his best-response strategy,
• the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader.
Game equilibrium may be estimated when all players are
choosing the best responses. The best response is pos-
sible to ﬁnd when the relevant optimization problem has
the solution. Therefore, it depends on the payoﬀ functions
shapes and form. From practical point of view, the numer-
ical methods are used to calculate proper strategies. Not
for every game the exact solution may be found.
Calculating leader strategy means ﬁnding optimal comput-
ing capacities. It is possible if there exists the solution of
problem (18) over the convex set [0,1]n−1.
Follower strategy is calculated by solving problem (17)
and (18). Finding optimal schedule is very time consum-
ing process, therefore the suboptimal schedules are used.
In this paper we used genetic algorithm for solving this
problem. The detailed solution may be found in [9].
Solving sub-game is much simpler. There is not many types
of VMs. Resource may choose ﬁnite number from a ﬁnite
amount of VM types. This is why the solution always
exists. It may be calculated using brute-force methods.
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9. Numerical Example
To illustrate the presented idea, we consider the example
Amazon Cloud and OpenStack VMs. The set VM is pre-
sented in Tables 1 and 2. The prices for instances are
listed in Table 3. The available number of VM of each
type and their computing capacities are presented in Ta-
ble 4. The batch of tasks consists of 8 tasks, see Table 5.
The assumed trust level oﬀered by the virtual resources is
tl1 = 1, tl2 = 3.
Table 4
The tested VM instances
Model Max no. Strategy Capacity [GFLOPS]
t2.nano m1(1) = 2 MV1(1) CCVM1(1) = 3
t2.small m1(2) = 3 MV1(2) CCVM1(2) = 3
t2.xl m1(3) = 2 MV1(3) CCVM1(3) = 12
t2.2xl m1(4) = 3 MV1(4) CCVM1(4) = 24
m4.16xl m1(5) = 2 MV1(5) CCVM1(5) = 147
Gen1-1 m2(1) = 3 MV1(1) CCVM2(1) = 3
Genl1-2 m2(2) = 3 MV1(2) CCVM2(2) = 5
Gen1-4 m2(3) = 2 MV1(3) CCVM2(3) = 10
Genl1-8 m2(4) = 2 MV1(4) CCVM2(4) = 21
Table 5
The tested batch of 8 tasks
Workload Security demand
w1 = 18 sd1 = 1
w = 922 sd2 = 1
w3 = 54 sd3 = 1
w4 = 62 sd4 = 2
w5 = 68 sd5 = 2
w6 = 41 sd6 = 1
w7 = 67 sd7 = 2
w8 = 85 sd8 = 1
The maximal and minimal capacities are:
ccmin1 = 3 ,
ccmax1 =2 ·3 + 3 ·3 +2 ·12+3 ·24+2 ·147=405 , (29)
ccmin2 = 3
ccmax2 = 3 ·3 + 3 ·5 +10 ·2 +21 ·2 = 86 . (30)
Considering conﬁgurations given by (6) and (7) the possible
computing capacity vector may be calculated as:
For a=0 . . .2, b=0 . . .3, c=0 . . .2, d =0 . . .3, e=0 . . .2
capacity(a,b,c,d,e) =
CCV Mi(1)a +CCVMi(1)b +CCVMi(1)c +
+CCVMi(1)d +CCVMi(1)e ; (31)
[cc1i ,cc
2
i . . . ,cc
pi
i ] = sort
(
unique
(
capacity(a,b,c,d,e)
))
,
(32)
where sort is sorting procedure. It places the given set of
values in the increasing order without repetitions.
For i = 1,2
pi = length
(
sort
(
unique(capacity(a,b,c,d,e))
))
, (33)
where sort is sorting the vector in descending order, unique
is erasing repetitive values.
The user of resource one chooses for p1 = 114 computing
capacities. The user of resource two chooses one of p2 = 72
computing capacity, see Table 6.
Table 6
Possible computing capacities
ccmin1 . . . . . . cc
max
1
3 6 9 . . . 177 180 . . . 399 402 405
ccmin2 . . . . . . cc
max
2
3 5 6 . . . 47 48 . . . 81 83 86
The assumed payoﬀ functions are deﬁned as [19]:
ui( ji) = 400 + 40cc1( j1)−
(
cc1( j1)
)2
, (34)
for i = 1, j1 = 1,2, . . . ,114, and
ui( ji) = 200 + 70cc1( j1)−
(
cc1( j1)
)2
, (35)
for i = 2, j2 = 1,2, . . . ,72.
The optimization problem to solve for user of resource 1
is:
max
x
114
∑
j1=1
(
400 + 40cc1( j1)− (cc1( j1)
)2)
· x1j1 , (36)
with assumption that each mixed strategy is possible:
j1=114∑
j1=1
x1j1 = 1,x
1
j1 ∈ [0,1] . (37)
This means that resource 1 tries to ﬁnd computing capacity
that results in maximum CPU credits per CPU unit.
The optimization problem to solve for user of resource 2 is
assumed as:
max
x
72
∑
j2=1
(
200 + 70cc1( j1)−
(
cc1( j1)
)2)
· x2j2 (38)
with assumption that each mixed strategy is possible:
j2=72∑
j2=1
x2j2 = 1,x
2
j2 ∈ [0,1] . (39)
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The objective of resource 2 is to ﬁnd such computing ca-
pacity so that the VMs have the best memory usage per
CPU unit.
Matlab linprog solver [20] was used for solving both above
simple linear programs deﬁned by linear equality con-
straints. Resource 1 declared capacity cc1 = 405 and re-
source 2 declared cc2 = 48.
The number of possible schedules without security de-
mands is big. If we consider security demands, then tasks
1, 2, 3, 6 and 8 may be assigned to the resource 1. In
such a case, resource 2 may calculate all the given tasks.
The number of possible schedules with security demands
is only 5. The ETC matrix takes the form:
ETC =[
1/405 0
0 1/48
]
·
[
18 92 54 62 68 41 67 85
18 92 54 62 68 41 67 85
]
. (40)
Considering security constraints:
ETC =[
0.044 0.22 0.13 ∞ ∞ 0.10 ∞ 0.20
0.37 1.91 1.12 1.29 1.41 0.85 1.39 1.77
]
. (41)
where ∞ time indicates that scheduling particular task on
the chosen resource is impossible.
The possible secure schedules and their makespans are the
following:
1. [t1,t2,t3,t6], [t4,t5,t7,t8],
makespan=max{0.044+0.22+0.13+0.10+0.20,
1.29+1.41+1.39+1.77}= max{0.694,5.86}= 5.86,
2. [t1,t2,t3,t8], [t4,t5,t7,t6],
makespan=max{0.044+0.22+0.13+0.2,
1.29+1.41+0.85+1.39 }= max{0.59,4.94}=4.94,
3. [t8,t2,t3,t6], [t4,t5,t7,t1],
makespan=max{0.2+0.22+0.13+0.1,
1.29+1.41+1.39+0.37}= max{0.65,4.46}= 4.46,
4. [t8,t1,t3,t6], [t4,t5,t7,t2],
makespan=max{0.2+0.044+0.13+0.10,
1.29+1.41+1.39+1.91}= max{0.47,6}= 6,
5. [t8,t1,t2,t6], [t4,t5,t7,t3],
makespan=max{0.2+0.044+0.22+0.1,
1.29+1.41+1.39+1.12}= max{0.56,5.21}= 5.21.
The optimal schedule is schedule no. 3. For this is schedule
the workload for resource 1 is
W (1) = w8 + w2 + w3 + w6 = 85 + 92 + 54 +41 = 272
and for resource 2 is
W (2) = w4 + w5 + w7 + w1 = 62 + 68 + 67 +18= 215 .
After solving problem (32), (33) considering prices from
Table 3 and Tab 4, for resource 1:
argmin[VM1(1),...,VM1(5)] (42)
272
405 ·
VM1(1)0.0065 + . . .+VM1(5)3.83
3600 (43)
and resource 2:
argmin[VM2(1),...,V M2(4)] (44)
215
72
·
VM2(1)0.0035 + . . .+VM2(4)0.028
3600 , (45)
with constraints (6) and (8), we obtain the optimum set
of VMs:
V M1=[VM1(1),V M1(2),V M1(3),VM1(4),VM1(5)]=
= [2,3,2,3,2] (46)
and
VM2 = [VM2(1),VM2(2),VM2(3),VM2(4)] =
= [0,2,2,2] . (47)
The next round of the game may be based on diﬀerent
assumed payoﬀ functions. The payoﬀs may depend on the
existing VMs, therefore they be the time dependent. Other
possibility is that the payoﬀ function of resource 1 may
depend on the last VMs set of resource 2. In such a case,
the future strategy of resource 1 is inﬂuenced by the former
strategy of resource 2.
For example, if resource 1 tries to ﬁnd computing capacity
that results in maximum CPU credits per CPU unit. Then,
optimization problem to solve for resource 1 is:
max
x
114
∑
j1=1
CPUCredits
vCPU( j1) ·hour( j1) x
1
j1 , (48)
with assumption that each mixed strategy is possible. When
the objective of resource 2 is to ﬁnd such computing capac-
ity so that the VMs have the very best memory per CPU
unit:
max
x
72
∑
j2=1
RAM( j2)
vCPU( j2) x
2
j2 , (49)
under assumption that each mixed strategy is possible.
10. Conclusions and Future Work
The Stackelberg game model can be used for supporting
the user of the CC decisions during renting VMs. Proposed
game stages are related to the information ﬂow process in
cloud. The proposed model enables the usage of on demand
recourse provisioning to minimize the computational cost.
In the proposed games, the users of virtual resources de-
cide ﬁrst, so they have special privileges, furthermore, they
choose computing capacities. The scheduling unit follows
the leaders and decide based on the leader’s actions. Third
step is the sub-game for virtual resources.
The following elements have been optimized: VMs com-
puting capacities due to virtual resources objectives, sched-
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ule for the given task batch, optimum set for that sched-
ule. Additionally, security aspects in the form of mapping
tasks security requirements into VMs declared trust level
are considered. In presented example for Amazon Cloud
and OpenStack VMs we considered the instances provided
by the largest cloud services providers. The number of vir-
tual resources and their characteristics can be varied over
time. The optimal strategy is calculated for each round of
the game.
Diﬀerent form of payoﬀ function was used. Proposed
model allows considering wide variety of virtual resources
behavior. One virtual resource payoﬀ may not depend on
other virtual resources strategies, or they may be inﬂuen-
tial. The central scheduler that was used is based on ETC
matrix approach and assumes fare share of number of tasks
among virtual resources. However, the model may be used
with any central scheduler.
The future work will focus on optimizing the trust level of
the virtual resources. In this paper trust levels was assumed
constant. The more elastic approach should be used.
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